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Patents as Escalators
Amelia S. Rinehart*
"You have to risk a strikeout in order to hit a home run."'
ABSTRACT
High technology companies commit time, effort, and resources to
innovation. Over the course of a research and development project, an
innovative company may face several sequential decisions regarding
whether to continue to invest in the project and whether to
commercialize the discoveries that have been made. Companies often
seek patents early in the research and development process to receive
the right to exclude others from practicing the invention. Given a
current trend toward earlier and earlier patent filing, several scholars
suggest that this strategy could leave many inventions underdeveloped;
companies may treat patents like real options, deciding later where to
place their resources to maximize their utility. This Article introduces
the escalation of commitments, which is a behavioral phenomenon
observed in decision making under uncertainty to the current trends in
patent filing. The Article further discusses the ramifications of
innovative companies' escalating commitments to developing patented
technology. Finally, the Article proposes that patents act to facilitate
such commitment, in part because patents keep sunk costs relevant to
the patent owner making decisions regarding further commitment. In
this manner, patents may escalate the commercialization of patented
technology.
(0 2011 Amelia Smith Rinehart. Associated Professor of Law, S. J. Quinney College of
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On November 22, 1940, the New York Times reported that an
obscure patent attorney named Chester F. Carlson received US Patent
No. 2,221,776 for a new photography method that would allow for the
instantaneous creation of permanent printed copies.2 After obtaining
several more related patents and being rejected by countless
companies for potential licensing deals, Carlson sold his patents to the
Battelle Memorial Institute, an Ohio research organization with no
manufacturing capability.3  Two years later, Battelle exclusively
licensed the Carlson patents to Haloid Corporation of Rochester, New
York, 4 a photographic paper company fighting for its life against much
larger local rival, Kodak.5  The new process became known as
xerography, Haloid became Xerox, and the rest became history-but
not until the pioneering patents on the underlying technology
expired.6  Why did Carlson and Xerox pursue the commercial
development of a patented invention despite long delays, product
2. Electrical Photos Speed Development, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1940, at 22 (describing
Carlson's technology).
3. DAVID OWEN, COPIES IN SECONDS 127-29 (2004).
4. Erwin A. Blackstone, Restrictive Practices in the Marketing of Electrofax Copying
Machines and Supplies: The SCM Corporation Case, 23 J. INDUS. ECON. 189, 189 (1975).
5. OWEN, supra note 3, at 123-27.
6. Until 1999, patents received a seventeen-year term from the date of issue. See Bruce
Lehman, Major Biotechnology Issues for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 33 CAL. W. L.
REV. 49, 55-56 (1996). Hence, Carlson's earliest patent expired in November 1957. See US Patent
No. 2,221,776 (filed Sept. 8, 1938) (issued Nov. 19, 1940). The first successful commercial copier
utilizing xerography, the Xerox 914 model, made its first sale in 1961. OWEN, supra note 3, at
237. Currently, patents receive a twenty-year term from the date of filing or a priority date
determined by statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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failures, discouraging disinterest from potential licensees indicating
no demand for the end product, and patents nearing their expiration
dates? This Article aims to answer that question by introducing the
concept of escalation of commitment, a behavioral phenomenon
observed in decision making under uncertainty, to technological'
research and development decisions.
High-risk, high-reward innovation, like xerography and many
other inventions, entails not just the likelihood of high costs of
research and development, but the likelihood of great uncertainty with
regard to both technical and commercial success. Viewing the
research and development process as well as the patent grant through
a "real option" lens, where obtaining the patent may be described as
purchasing an option to litigate and commercialize the invention it
claims, scholars have suggested that current patent policy encourages
earlier and earlier patenting of inventions, which, in turn, encourages
firms to under develop their many patented prospects.7
Underdeveloped but patented technology, these scholars argue, should
be considered a drain on the patent system and a cost to society at
large.8
Learning from behavioral research and patent policy, this
Article presents the novel argument that patents may incentivize
commercialization of high-risk, high-reward innovations by
encouraging investment commitments to high-risk technology.
Accordingly, rather than posing a danger of underdevelopment,
patents may encourage the commercialization of patented inventions,
especially those with large sunk costs and highly uncertain technical
achievement or commercial success. Despite discouraging feedback,
Carlson and Xerox persisted and achieved extraordinary success over
time. Other famous inventors, including Thomas Edison, the "father
of invention,"9 and Edwin Land, who revolutionized instant
photography, 0 often abandoned patented projects only after
7. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patents, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 1065 (2007) (presenting the case for underdevelopment relying on real options logic);
Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 IOwA J. CORP. L. 1127, 1132
(2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Real Options]; Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in
Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (2009) [hereinafter Cotropia, Folly]; Videotape: Patents as
Options (Shaun Martin and Frank Partnoy, Washington Univ. in St. Louis 2005) (on file with
author).
8. See Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 112-13.
9. See DVD: Biography-Thomas A. Edison: Father of Invention (A&E Home Video
2006).
10. Eric Pace, Edwin H. Land is Dead at 81; Inventor of Polaroid Camera, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/02/obituaries/edwin-h-land-is-dead-at-81-inventor
-of-polaroid-camera.html.
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exhausting huge amounts of time, money and other resources. Due to
the risk of escalation of commitment to patented prospects, modeling
patents and research and development projects using real options
logic must take the characteristics of decision making into account in
order to adequately describe the role of patents in innovation and
technology commercialization.
Part I of this Article summarizes the incentive functions of the
US patent system to place the commercialization behavior of a patent
owner into the context of his right to exclude others.
Part II introduces the real options logic model of research and
development projects and then extends the logic to patents by
describing the costs a patent owner must weigh in order to determine
(1) whether to obtain the option to exclude others by seeking patent
protection and (2) whether to exercise the option through leverage,
litigation, or licensing of the patent. A "file early, file often" mentality
among inventors arises as a consequence of the US patent system
rules and the value to be found in the exclusive rights granted by
patents through litigation, licensing, and leverage." On the one hand,
encouraging early filing results in more competitive patent races
between rivals, with earlier and earlier patent filing dates. This
should result in earlier patent expiration dates and introduction of the
patented technology into the public domain sooner. 12 On the other
hand, expensive patent races may cause investors in patents to decline
exercising the option to leverage and to enforce the patent, introducing
the risk of underdeveloped patented technology.13
Part III describes the escalation of commitment to a failing
course of action, a behavioral phenomenon observed in decision
making under uncertainty. When firms receive ambiguous or
negative feedback regarding a course of action with large previous
investments, often companies continue to invest, "throwing good
money after bad."1 4 Escalation of commitment occurs when a company
considers sunk costs as relevant to a project. Not having made peace
with its losses, a company switches from risk aversion to risk seeking
in order to attempt to recoup the sunk costs. In the context of
technology investments and the innovation process, companies
suffering from a bias toward salient sunk costs continue to invest in
and pursue patent protection on technology with uncertain technical
11. See Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 69-70.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The phrase "throw good money after bad" means "to spend more money on
something that has already failed." CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN IDIOMS 275 (2003).
[Vol. 14:1:8184
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or commercialization success. Part III concludes by discussing the
role that patents play in the escalating commitment phenomenon. In
particular, this Part suggests that modeling patents in addition to
research and development projects as a series of real options lack the
ability to capture the escalating phenomenon. Because a company may
prefer to escalate despite uncertainty, assumptions regarding
abandonment or delay of the project are unreliable. When escalation
of commitment influences decisions, underdevelopment may not occur.
Part IV discusses the upside and downside of escalation of
commitment, including successes despite uncertainty and predictable
failures, which may be perceived as either wasteful or socially
productive despite private losses. In this Part, the Article further
proposes countermeasures to enhance learning from escalation
behavior in ways that feed back into the patenting process itself. By
embracing and learning from both successes and failures rather than
"throwing good money after bad,"' 5 patent owners may achieve a
better investment strategy for high-risk, high-reward technology,
which in turn will help to introduce new technologies and to expand
innovation's frontiers outward.
I. INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE: AN OVERVIEW
The US Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause grants
Congress the power to promote the progress of the useful arts by
giving limited exclusive rights in discoveries to inventors. 16 From its
inception in 1790, scholars have described the patent system in
utilitarian terms as providing incentives to innovate in exchange for
limited rights to exclude.17 More particularly, the patent system
functions both ex ante to entice innovation with the promise of future
exclusion of others and ex post to encourage commercialization of
patented inventions by providing patents of sufficient strength or
breadth to attract capital.' 8 In so doing, patents provide private
benefits to the patent owner in the form of limited but exclusive
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAw 7, 19 (2008)
(characterizing patent law as "designed to enhance social welfare through the production of and
access to innovations"); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
18. See generally F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of
Commercializing Innovation, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 727, 732-36 (2005) (discussing methods to bridge
the "valley of death" between innovation and commercialization); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004)
(cautioning against the applicability of an ex post justification such as prospect and public goods
theories).
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rights. Patents also provide public benefits, including innovation
advancement and information disclosure through the public domain
patent document.19
Such private and public benefits are not costless, however. The
patent system incurs large administrative costs in the form of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), which
examines applications, issues patents, and manages the rules
applicable to patent procurement and maintenance. 20 The patent
system's grant of exclusive rights to private parties also creates the
potential for deadweight loss in the form of output restriction by
patent owners as well as the potential for patent races between rivals,
which results in considerable expenditures prior to obtaining patent
protection.21 Both of these are important societal costs. 2 2  By
balancing these costs with the benefits to society and to patent
owners, the patent system exists on the premise that the resulting
promotion of progress justifies the price society pays.23
Granting a patent, however, does not promote progress
standing alone. The USPTO examines and issues patents on new and
useful inventions,24 but the job is left to the patent owner to develop
19. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 216 (2008).
20. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006).
21. On some of the costs of output restriction, see T. Randolph Beard et al., Quantifying
the Cost of Substandard Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 240 (2009),
for an examination of the deadweight losses that result from granting substandard patents. On
the costs of races to invent, see Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 348 (1968), for a model of competition among firms to innovate. Barzel's model suggests
that competition introduces innovations earlier than is optimal, creating a "basic wasteful effect .
. . [that] lies not in duplicating the use of resources but in using these resources prematurely,
when they would have earned a higher return elsewhere in the economy." Id. at 352. Duffy
characterizes these competitions to innovate as "inefficient races to invent that can dissipate any
social surplus associated with an invention." John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of
Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2004).
22. Id.
23. Of course, as noted by William Landes and Richard Posner, "whether the benefits
exceed the costs is impossible to answer with confidence on the basis of present knowledge."
wILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 310 (2003); see FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
20-21 (1958) (describing the four best-known theories as "natural law," "reward-for-monopoly,"
"monopoly-profit-incentive," and "exchange-for-secrets" theses). Machlup-who famously
declared that establishing a new patent system, if none existed, would be irresponsible based
upon our lack of economic justification-then turned around and declared that abolishing our
current patent system would also be irresponsible. MACHLUP, supra, at 80. For a detailed
analysis of the nineteenth century patent abolitionist movement in the context of informing
current patent law reforms, see Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899
(2002).
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101. Invention refers to the discovery of new technology; innovation, on
the other hand, refers to the introduction of new technology to the marketplace. See OFFICE OF
TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-BP-ITC-165, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF
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the technology, alone or in combination with complementary
technologies, and to deliver a new product or process to the
marketplace. In order to do so, the patent owner or its licensees must
expend scarce resources, which could be used in other lines of research
or on other commercial endeavors. The utilitarian nature of the
patent system lends itself to two different functions that relate to
incentivizing innovation: incentivizing invention and incentivizing
commercialization.
A. Patents as Incentives to Invent
The traditional view of patents as providing private value
through exclusive rights may best be described as a reward function. 25
The possibility of obtaining the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, selling, or importing into the United States
any patented invention gives the patent owner an incentive to engage
in creating an invention. 26 Potential patent owners may treat the
right to exclude as a private reward for inventing.2 7 The right to
exclude also entices the inventor to disclose his invention to the public
by virtue of the public domain patent document.28 Taken as a whole,
the patent system's reward function has been very persuasive in
courts and in literature as a justification for patents, being cited as
"an efficient method of enabling the benefits of research and
development to be internalized, thus promoting innovation and
technological progress." 29
EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 2 (Sept. 1995) (defining innovation, invention, and commercialization);
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934); Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 805, 845 (1988) (describing the economics of innovation according to Joseph Schumpeter);
Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1201, 1209-13 (2008) (distinguishing innovation and invention by small firms).
25. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 632-33 (2002) (describing
in detail this "simple view" of the patent system and suggesting a model of patents as a signaling
mechanism to convey information); see also Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction
to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 8 (1991).
26. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) ("The patent laws
promote . . . progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development."). See
generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (defining patent owner's right to exclude).
27. Besen & Raskind, supra note 25 ("The patent offers the incentive of the statutory
right to exclude as a means for inducing creative activity.").
28. "In return for the right of exclusion-this 'reward for inventions,'-the patent laws
impose upon the inventor a requirement of disclosure." Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480 (citation
omitted) (citing Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944)).
29. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 294; see Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480.
872011]
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Each of these reward theories derives from the perception that
too few inventors would make or disclose their inventions publicly
without patent protection; the inventor's competitors who do not share
in research and development costs may easily appropriate the
invention.30 Once competitors quickly imitate successful inventions,
the price of the resulting product or process will move quickly toward
a competitive level, leaving the original inventor unable to gain
enough value from the invention to offset his irreversible costs of
discovering and developing the invention. 31 Moreover, the uncertain
outcome associated with high-risk projects may increase the
probability of underinvestment prior to commercialization. 3 2  To
overcome these hurdles to innovation, patent owners obtain the right
to exclude others from practicing the invention, which provides the
ability, in many cases, to exceed free-market levels of private return.33
To enhance the public benefits obtained in exchange for the patent
owner's right to exclude, patent procurement rules require disclosure
of the invention in enough detail "as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains . .. to make and use the same."34
The reward function invites several points of objection. First,
the output restriction inherent in providing exclusive rights has the
potential to encourage monopoly pricing by the patent owner.35
Without resorting to such output restriction, traditional methods for
incentivizing investment may be sufficient to encourage invention,
including first mover advantages, lead time delays, know how, and the
like. 3 6  Second, patent incentives may alter economic activity by
30. This is often referred to as the "appropriability problem" that the patent system
hopes to solve. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 247, 247 (1994) (arguing that the patent system has minimized the impact of its
inefficiencies); John S. Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251,
2257 (2002) (addressing whether the patent system goes too far in solving the appropriability
problem by granting too much appropriability); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (2005) (pointing out flaws in the appropriability story due
to a paradox in patent value).
31. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1025 (1989) (citing MACHLUP, supra note 23, at 58-
59).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1025. Such returns above market value may be referred to as
supracompetitive returns. Id.
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring that applicants disclose the invention in
enough detail to allow someone skilled in the art to practice the invention, commonly known as
the enablement requirement); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974).
35. See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 1025-27.
36. Id. at 1026-27; see also Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1254-56 (2004) (challenging the incentives theory (reward function)
with empirical evidence describing private patent protection mechanisms, including first-mover
88 [Vol. 14:1:81
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encouraging patent races among rivals, with each company spending
resources on early development in order to win valuable patents. 37
Once a company wins a patent, future innovators may avoid the
patent's domain and refrain from improvements to the patented
invention, even if those improvements are valuable contributions to
technology and patentable in their own right.38 Third, patent owner
infringement actions may cause duplicative efforts from rivals seeking
to design around the patent claims. 39 With regard to the reward for
disclosure, critics object on the grounds that the alternative, keeping
the invention a secret, may not be a practical strategy for the inventor
and thus he does not need a patent to effect disclosure. 40 Finally, if an
invention may be practiced in secret, then infringement may occur in
secret, making enforcement impossible for a patent owner. 41
B. Patents as Incentives to Commercialize
Although the reward function of patenting remains popular, 42
scholars have observed another role of the patent system-rewarding
the commercialization of an invention after it has been made.
Scholars associate the idea that patents incentivize commercialization
in addition to invention with a "prospect function" of patents. 43
Recognizing that intense rivalry exists among potential innovators,
advantages, copy protection, contracts and industry norms, and proposes a market-entry theory
as a normative justification for the patent system).
37. See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 1026-28.
38. Id. at 1027.
39. Id. at 1027-28.
40. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 68
(5th ed. 2011).
41. Id.
42. See generally Lemley, supra note 18, at 149 (advocating for the reward theory as a
more principled justification for the patent system).
43. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 266 (1977). In this widely cited paper, Kitch first argued that the patent system
functions not just to "enablej an inventor to capture the returns from his investment in the
invention"-now commonly known as the reward function-but also "to increase the output from
resources used for technological innovation," which Kitch termed the prospect function. Id. at
265-66. Kitch's "prospect theory" has become standard reading for students of patent law, and
has inspired debates both for and against his propositions regarding the functions of a patent
system. See Duffy, supra Note 21. At 440-42 (highlighting both supporters and critics of Kitch's
"controversial" arguments). Compare Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1045-46 (1997) (describing Kitch's article as "one
of the most significant efforts to integrate intellectual property with property rights theory"),
with Roger L. Beck, The Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5
RES. L. ECON. 193, 194 (1985) (undermining belief in the prospect theory). For a critique of the
prospect function, see Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects and
Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197 (1980).
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the prospect function suggests that granting a broad exclusive
property right at an early stage in the innovation process should limit
competitive rivalry. 44 The promise of private rewards encourages
inventors to invent and then the prospect of further commercialization
provided by a patent reduces the competitive dissipation of these
returns by rivalry. The patent owner who wins the race to the patent
office and thus obtains the first patent rights in an inventive area
then may use those rights to manage development of the patent's
value by himself and others, reducing duplicative investment in
innovation and thereby improving social welfare.45
By focusing on patent owners' channeling capabilities rather
than the elimination of rivalry, the prospect features of the patent
system could work to guide commercialization in ways that maximize
the social benefits received from the grant of exclusive rights.4 6  If
inventors analogize these early patent races to auctions for the broad
right to exclude others, 4 7 they may improve their chances of winning
patent races (and of obtaining exclusive rights) by investing earlier
and earlier in the patenting process.4 8 The competitor who publicly
discloses his invention at the earliest time wins the patent race. 4 9 If
patent policy allows for patenting of incipient technology, the public
benefits from an earlier expiration date for the patent50 and, at the
same time, the private and social costs of rivalry go down due to
reduced spending on early-stage development and duplicative
innovation efforts.51
Apart from incentivizing commercialization through the early
granting of broad patent rights-whether because of reduced rivalry
44. See Kitch, supra note 43, at 276 (responding to Barzel's demonstration of
inefficiencies from rivalry to invent as causing dissipation of social surplus); see also Barzel,
supra note 221.
45. Kitch, supra note 43, at 276.
46. See Duffy, supra note 21, at 444-45. Duffy describes Kitch's comparison of the
patent system to a mineral rights system "as a very imperfect analogy for the patent system,"
and likens the patent system to Harold Demsetz's proposal for regulating natural monopoly
industries. Id. In such natural monopolies, where "a single firm can serve the entire market
more efficiently than multiple competing firms can," Demsetz recognized "that private
competition could be harnessed to accomplish the same objective as government price regulation"
by auctioning the exclusive franchise to introduce competition on price and quality. Id. at 445.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 443-45.
49. Id. at 445. Duffy recharacterizes the prospect function as a question of "not whether
rents will be dissipated, but how they will be dissipated." Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
50. Id. The patent will expire earlier because it is filed earlier than it would have been
filed had a race to invent and patent not taken place between rivals. Accordingly, the patent
term of twenty years measured from the effective filing date of the patent application begins




rent dissipation or because of early patent expiration-the patent's
right to exclude is "a Coasian-type property right placed on the
public's auction block by the government."52  "The downstream
commercialization [of a patented invention] requires coordination
among the many complementary users . . . including, inter alia,
developers, manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, advertisers,
and marketers."53 A private property system, complete with the right
to exclude others, facilitates this coordination; the patent serves as a
beacon for these users, helping them find each other to negotiate the
rights needed for efficient bargaining. 54 Patent claims, the metes and
bounds of the patented invention, provide public notice of the patent
owner's exclusive rights to all parties involved in the market for that
technology, who will bargain to an efficient result-the company best
suited to bring the patented invention to market will do so.65
What happens when commercialization requires improvements
to the patented technology? Since a broad initial patent comprises a
right to exclude, not an affirmative right to practice the invention,56 an
inventor may patent improvements to a patented technology, provided
that the improvements are useful, novel, and not obvious.57 As a
result, competition for exclusive rights to a technology may continue
after the USPTO grants a patent because the patent owner and the
patent owner's rivals search for and patent, if possible, improvements
to the original technology.58 Rival improvers also "have an incentive
to contract with the pioneer[ing patent owner] prior to investing in"
commercialization efforts or in unpatentable improvements. 59 In the
case of unpatentable improvements, "the prospect [function] applies
without qualification: The pioneer can coordinate, and control the
timing of, all investment in [un]patentable improvements on the
patented technology."60 For example, the pioneer who invents an
52. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 40, at 69.
53. Kieff, supra note 18, at 735.
54. Id.
55.- Id. at 735-36.
56. See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of
Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 174, 198 (2004) ("[P]atents only give a right to
exclude. The right to use is derived from sources external to IP law."). But see Adam Mossoff,
Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 321 (2009) (recommending a
more expansive view to include use and disposition).
57. For the applicable statutory provisions for patentability, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 101
(utility), 102 (novelty) and 103 (non-obviousness).
58. Duffy, supra note 21, at 483.
59. Id. at 486.
60. Id. (noting that "coordination increases the efficiency with which the investment can
be made").
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innovative radiant heater can coordinate the manufacture of a paving
machine utilizing the heater to improve the quality of asphalt
pavement.61 The manufacturer of the improved paving machine, an
infringer of the patented technology, must obtain permission from the
pioneer in order to develop his machine improving upon the patented
technology. 62
In contrast, patentable improvements are common rights
available to any inventor, not just the pioneering patent owner. 63
Therefore, the fear of entry by competitors may drive a pioneering
patent owner to quickly patent improvements himself or to coordinate
the efforts of others in such improvements. 64 For example, a pioneer
who invents an active ingredient drug with a special coating that
prevents degradation of the drug before it reaches its intended
interaction site will have an incentive to create follow-on inventions
such as an embodiment with a second coating that exhibits improved
delivery of the drug in vivo.65 If the pioneer does not invest in
improvements, he may find himself subject to patents obtained by
others, requiring negotiation for the rights to those improvements that
are commercially or technologically superior to his pioneer technology.
II. PATENTS AND REAL OPTIONS LOGIC
As discussed above, providing incentives to invent and
commercialize useful, novel, and non-obvious technology has
traditionally justified the patent system. 66 Apart from being a reward,
the right to exclude others may channel competition into accelerated
patenting, which could have positive externalities when earlier patent
61. See Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 58 (1969). In
Anderson's-Black Rock, the Court declared the patent invalid on the grounds that it was obvious
in view of the pioneering patent on the innovative radiant heater in combination with the
elements of a known paving machine. Id. Improvements that are obvious over prior technology
are unpatentable per 35 U.S.C. § 103. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416-17
(2007) (discussing, inter alia, Anderson's-Black Rock and the obviousness standard required by §
103).
62. Duffy, supra note 21, at 486.
63. Id. at 489.
64. Id.
65. See In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Omeprazole,
the court determined that a second coating was not an obvious improvement to the underlying
prior patent comprising a single coating of the drug omeprazole (brand name Prisolec@). Id. In
its 2010 KSR Guidelines Update, the USPTO describes the Omeprazole case in detail to instruct
examiners and the public as to the obviousness inquiry under § 103. See Examination Guidelines
Update: Developments in the Obviousness Inquiry After KSR v. Teleflex, 75 Fed. Reg. 53,643,
53,646 (Sept. 1, 2010).
66. Duffy, supra note 21, at 488.
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terms expire, and as a result of earlier filing,67 transfer the patented
technology to the public domain. Moreover, the right to exclude and
the public disclosure function operate to coordinate commercialization
through bargaining among potential stakeholders. The process of
obtaining a patent and the patent owner's subsequent decisions to
commercialize (or not) the technology has been modeled using real
options logic to better capture the value of patent protection.
A real option, like an ordinary stock option, features a
purchase of rights that the purchaser may exercise later.68 Real
options logic, also known as real options reasoning, models potential
firm investments as real options in order to make strategic resource
allocation decisions for the firm. 69 Modelers have used real options
logic to describe the patent as an option to exclude others from
practicing the patented technology.7 0 A patent owner exercises the
option to exclude others by commercializing the invention, negotiating
with others for licenses, and enforcing the patent against infringers
through litigation. Of course, the patent owner may decline to
exercise the option, never excluding others, or delay in order to gather
more information to inform the decision to exercise the option. 72
Using this framework, early patent filing, as a result of the US patent
procurement rules, creates a potential for underdevelopment of
patented technology. In option terms, the option price for the patent
is too low compared to the exercise price, given the uncertainty
inherent in exercise and the shortened expiration period in such cases.
Part II.A describes the real options logic framework as applied to
patents. Part II.B discusses the concern for underdevelopment in the
context of the real option framework.
67. See supra note 50.
68. Rita Gunther McGrath et al., Real Options as Engines of Choice and Heterogeneity,
29 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 86, 86-89 (2004).
69. Id.; see Ron Adner & Daniel A. Levinthal, What is Not a Real Option: Considering
Boundaries for the Application of Real Options to Business Strategy, 29 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 74, 75
(2004) (explaining that real options feature "sequential, irreversible investments made under
conditions of uncertainty"). In general, an option creates value by generating future rights in
decisions made by the option holder. Adner & Levinthal, supra, at 75-76.
70. See Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1137.
71. See id. at 1137-38 (describing exercise of the option as involving exclusion of others
from making, using, selling, or offering for sale the invention); see also Martin & Partnoy, supra
note 7.
72. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1132; see Abramowicz, supra note 7, at
1075-76. When the patent owner delays exercise of the option, he may be doing so to gain greater
certainty as to the value of the right to exclude. Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1075-76.
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A. Real Options Logic
Options are mechanisms through which firms reduce the
strategic risk of making commitments. In general, an option creates
value by generating future rights in decisions made by the option
holder.73 An investment in a financial option purchases the right, but
not the obligation, to either buy or sell an underlying asset at some
point in the future. 74 By analogy, an investment in a real option
conveys the right, but not the obligation, for a firm to make, defer or
abandon further investments in a project or a course of action.75 Like
financial options, real options are "a limited commitment that creates
future decision rights."76  Real options logic involves modeling
potential investments as real options in order to make decisions
regarding strategic resource allocations.77 Real options logic allows
the firm to treat a venture of uncertain future value as a complex
option that incorporates the variables underlying the value of the
venture.78 This approach has been successfully used to value natural
resources, oil leases, and other real assets.79
Likewise, when approaching research and development
projects, some firms prefer to use real options as a heuristic for
making decisions on sequential investments in uncertain technology.
In this way, abandonment or delay remains an option as the firm
collects more information about the technology in hopes of resolving
the uncertainty.80 The value of research and development is almost
73. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1129; see Adner & Levinthal, supra note 69.
74. Literature often describes options as the right, but not the obligation, to do
something. See, e.g., F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative
Games, and the Complex Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1195 (2003).
75. See Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1129; Rita Gunther McGrath & Atul
Nerkar, Real Options Reasoning and a New Look at the R&D Investment Strategies of
Pharmaceutical Firms, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 2 (2004) (using real options theory to describe
how investors make decisions with regards to investments in research and development); Asghar
Zardkoohi, Do Real Options Lead to Escalation of Commitment?, 29 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 111, 111
(2004) (describing real options as "toehold investments designed to better prepare the investor to
meet uncertain events in the future"); Arvids A. Ziedonis, Real Options in Technology Licensing,
53 MGMT. SCI. 1618 (2007).
76. McGrath et al., supra note 68, at 86.
77. Id. at 86-87; see Adner & Levinthal, supra note 69, at 75 (noting that real options
feature "sequential, irreversible investments made under conditions of uncertainty").
78. See Eduardo S. Schwartz, Patents and R&D as Real Options, 33 ECON. NOTES 23, 24
(2004).
79. Id. (citing M.J. Brennan & E.S. Schwartz, Evaluating Natural Resource
Investments, 58 J. BUS. 135 (1985); James L. Paddock et al., Option Valuation of Claims on Real
Assets: The Case of Offshore Petroleum Leases, 103 Q. J. ECON. 479 (1988)).
80. Rita Gunther McGrath, A Real Options Logic for Initiating Technology Positioning
Investments, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 974, 976-77 (1997).
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entirely calculated by option value; conventional valuation methods
like the discounted cash flow model fail to adequately value research
investments.81 Real options logic is an alternative approach that
takes into account the firm's options to invest, abandon, or delay the
project when determining the desirability of the research and
development project to the firm over time.82
When companies model research and development projects as
real options, patents obtained on the resulting technology often play
an important role in calculating the value of the options, and
therefore, the project. 83 For example, companies use real options logic
to determine, before investment starts, the value of pharmaceutical
research and development projects and the patents protecting them.84
A real options model of pharmaceutical research and development and
patents must take into account the investment costs and expected
cash flows as a result of the investment.85  In the case of
pharmaceuticals, cash flows from an approved drug.86 Patents play a
relevant role in the duration and size of both investment costs and
future cash flows and thus play an integral part in valuation of the
overall project.87
Conceptually removed from the long-term research and
development project, companies also model the patent instrument as a
real option itself. Most commonly, companies borrow from financial
option pricing theory and utilize real options to determine patent
pricing in the context of asset valuation or licensing decisions.88 For
81. Ming-Cheng Wu & Chun-Yao Tseng, Valuation of Patent-A Real Options
Perspective, 13 APPLIED EcoN. LETTERS 313, 314 (2006).
82. Id.
83. Schwartz, supra note 78, at 46-47. See generally Mark Schankerman, How Valuable
is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field, 29 RAND J. EcON. 77 (1998).
84. Schwartz, supra note 78, at 45. Schwartz discusses incorporation of patent policy
changes into his real options model of pharmaceutical research and development projects to
reflect entry of competitors as a result of Hatch-Waxman patent term extension or to reflect a
change in patent term overall. Id. He also mentions the limitations of using patents to determine
timing of cash flows without accounting for litigation and unenforceability concerns, noting that




87. Id. at 25.
88. See, e.g., Denton & Heald, supra note 74 (developing a variant of the Black-Scholes
equation for valuing stock options in order to price patent licenses modeled as real options). The
Black-Scholes option pricing model has been used to establish prices for patents. See id. at 1213;
Lauren Johnston Stiroh & Richard T. Rapp, Modern Methods for the Valuation of Intellectual
Property, 532 PLI/PAT 817 (1998). For further explanation of the Black-Scholes model, see
Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL.
EcoN. 637 (1973); Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Valuation of Option Contracts and a Test
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example, an intellectual property holding company may use a common
financial option pricing model to identify an appropriate royalty rate
for a license of its patent portfolio by taking into account the present
value of the technology's expected cash flows, the present value of the
investment cost, the time until expiration of the patent, a risk-free
rate of interest, and the uncertainty of the underlying technology over
time.89 Financial option pricing models require several assumptions
that limit their application to robust patent valuation-assumptions
that are strained in the context of patent licensing where markets are
not liquid and pricing is not continuously adjusting-but the
application of financial options pricing theory has advanced the state
of the art of patent valuation.90
More recently, scholars have extended real options logic from
valuation to the patent policy realm.91 Patents involve a great deal of
uncertainty as to the value of its right to exclude others, i.e., concerns
about the patent's scope, validity, and enforceability. These
uncertainties lend toward modeling the patent instrument as a real
option to exclude others, including the right to exercise, delay, or
abandon the option up and until the patent expires. 92 The flexibility
inherent in modeling decisions with real options logic lends itself to
the uncertainty of patent scope and enforceability in the same manner
as it does to research and development projects of uncertain viability.
of Market Efficiency, 27 J. FIN. 399 (1972); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing,
4 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SC. 141 (1973). Merton and Scholes were awarded the 1997 Nobel
Prize in Economics for the dynamic option pricing theory captured by the Black-Scholes option
pricing model, as Black passed away before the prize was awarded. Press Release,
Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
1997 (Oct. 14, 1997), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economics/laureates/
1997/press.html. Best-selling author Michael Lewis implicated the Black-Scholes model in the
collapse of the subprime mortgage bond market because it "underestimated the risk of extreme
and rare events." Michael Lewis, Inside Wall Street's Black Hole, PORTFOLIO.COM (Feb. 19, 2008),
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/02/19/Black-Scholes-
Pricing-Modellindex2.html.
89. Fernando Torres, Establishing Licensing Rates Through Options, IP FRONTLINE
(Sept. 11, 2006), http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=12586&deptid=3. Torres uses
the Black-Scholes option pricing model to establish the royalty rate for patent licenses. See
Darius Kharabi, A Real Options Analysis of Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology Licensing, 11 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 201, 216-17 (2006). Kharabi describes the utility of option pricing in the context
of biotechnology licenses as a "back-of-the-envelope calculation [that] provides a company with
additional valuable insight into the license's value." Id. at 231.
90. See Denton & Heald, supra note 74, at 1204-05; Kharabi, supra note 89, at 217.
Denton and Heald adapted the Black-Scholes model to deal with the special context of patent
licensing by adjusting the assumptions and adding a negotiation component consistent with
game theory. See Denton & Heald, supra note 74, at 1203.
91. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7; Partnoy & Martin, supra note 7.
92. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1131-32.
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Patents modeled as real options require first a purchase
decision then an exercise decision (or multiple similar exercise
decisions as explained below); the patent owner should rationally
compare the price of the option or the exercise thereof and determine
whether he should proceed based on expected future revenue.93 An
inventive entity (whether an individual or company) must first buy
the option by applying for and successfully obtaining the patent
instrument from the USPTO. 94  The option price comprises the
USPTO filing fees, preparation fees for the application, the pre-
application cost of invention, and the cost of disclosure. 95 Although
the filing fees are fixed by the USPTO and preparation fees may be
relatively uniform across industries and perhaps within geographical
regions, the cost of pre-application invention may be highly variable
within the same industry and with regard to applications claiming
similar subject matter. Due to the rigorous requirements of the
Patent Act, an inventor may not obtain a patent unless the invention
is new, useful, not obvious, within the categories of statutory subject
matter, and properly disclosed.96 Therefore, prior to applying for a
patent, the inventor must expend resources inventing-time and
capital devoted to developing the technology sufficiently to support a
patent application that meets these requirements. 97 Obviously, this
investment will vary among industries and technology arts, as well as
among individual inventors.98 Importantly, the timing of the filing of
93. This may not always be the case, as explained more fully infra in Parts III and IV.
94. Partnoy & Martin, supra note 7.
95. See Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1135-37. The application fee required by
the USPTO includes a base fee that increases if the application contains more than twenty
claims total, contains more than three independent claims, or exceeds one hundred pages. 37
C.F.R. § 1.16(a), (i), (s) (2011). The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)
reports that the median amount charged by a patent professional to prepare an original utility
patent application for a complex electrical case in 2008 was $10,000, for a complex mechanical
case $9,000, and for a complex biotech case $12,000. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw AsS'N,
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009 25 (2009). An inventor may prosecute his application pro
se. However, due to the credentials needed to competently prosecute a patent application, even
the Federal Circuit has cautioned against this practice. See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504
F.3d 1223, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding a pro se inventor's patents unenforceable due to
inequitable conduct during prosecution). As the Federal Circuit noted, "[the pro se inventor],
while apparently gaining considerable knowledge of the patenting process, thought he didn't
need professional patent help. The result of this case, regrettably, proves that he was wrong."
Nilssen, 504 F.3d at 1235.
96. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006) (providing for utility and eligible subject
matter, novelty, non-obviousness, and proper disclosure, respectively).
97. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1135-36.
98. A "Eureka!" moment may be much less costly than a technology developed slowly
and painstakingly over time. Id. at 1135 (citing Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581-83 (2003)).
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a patent application will influence the pre-application cost of invention
in tangible ways. If the inventor files early in the development
process but has not been involved in an expensive race to invent with
competitors, the option price could be lower than if the patent
applicant waited until later in the development process to file.
However, if the inventor files early in the development process after
engaging in (and winning) an expensive patent race, the option price
could be many times higher than if the inventor had not raced to the
patent office at all.
The cost of disclosure may be similarly difficult to quantify. In
order to obtain a patent, the inventor must make a full and clear
disclosure of the invention in his patent application."9 When the
patent issues (or earlier if the application is published within eighteen
months of its filing),100 "the public receives a meaningful disclosure in
exchange for being excluded from practicing an invention for a period
of time."' 0 ' Accordingly, the Patent Act requires that the patent
specification provide a written description of the invention and must
"enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains."102 The cost
to the patent applicant of disclosing to the public his invention in such
specific terms-the quid pro quo for the right to exclude-comprises
the cost of triggering the efforts of others to design around the
invention or to develop patentable improvements on the invention.
This cost could be the opportunity cost of choosing the patent regime
over keeping the invention a secret. 103
In addition to a purchase price, the patent option must also
have an exercise price, which requires an analysis of how the real
option to exclude others is exercised by the patent owner. Three types
of conduct by the patent owner exercise the option: leverage, litigation,
and licensing. 104 Commercialization of the invention may be most
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (prescribing the requirements of disclosure in order to obtain a
patent).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A).
101. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also
J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) ('The disclosure
required by the Patent Act is 'the quid pro quo of the right to exclude."' (quoting Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ('The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.").
103. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1136-37.
104. Atul Nerkar & Ian C. Macmillan, Giving Up Competitive Advantage: The Role of




identified with leveraging the patent, when a patent owner uses his
right to exclude to "clearf[ shelf space" for the patented technology.105
Exercising the option in this manner requires that the patent owner
expend additional time and resources internally to develop the
technology into a commercially viable product or method.106 If the
patent applicant's pre-application investment has been inexpensive,
the cost of commercialization could be significant and vice versa.
In addition to leveraging the patent for profitable
commercialization, patent owners may attempt to capture value from
the right to exclude through litigation and licensing. Defined broadly,
litigation by the patent owner may include enforcement threats or
actual suits against infringers of the patent. 107 As a result of the wide
range of conduct within this category, the costs of litigating the patent
can range from inexpensive cease and desist letters to a very
expensive full-blown patent suit that proceeds to final judgment.10
Licensing may include either extracting rents from others or sharing
in the commercialization by competing with licensees in the market
for the patented technology.109 Accordingly, the patent owner
exercises his option by exploiting his right to exclude, by leveraging
the patent to commercialize the technology, by licensing others to
compete with him, by foregoing commercialization and licensing for
revenue, and/or by litigating to obtain remedies from infringers. 110
The value of the option will be limited in time because of the
limited duration of patent rights-a patent ordinarily expires twenty
years from the filing date of the application, which sets an absolute
maximum duration for the option to exclude others.111 The patent
105. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1137.
106. Id. at 1137-38.
107. Nerkar & Macmillan, supra note 104, at 8 (defining the option exercise as one of
litigation, licensing, and leverage); see also Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1138.
Cotropia, citing Partnoy and Martin, identifies two different ways of exercising the patent:
commercialization and assertion. Cotropia, supra note 7, at 1138. Because the real option value
is in the patent's right to exclude others from practicing the claimed invention, the option is
exercised by the three types of conduct Nerkar and Macmillan describe-litigation, licensing, and
leverage. Nerkar & Macmillan, supra note 104, at 7-8.
108. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1138-39. For patent infringement of more
than $25 million, AIPLA reports a median patent litigation cost (including attorneys' fees) of $5.5
million for litigation to final judgment, with an average cost of $6.25 million and a third quartile
cost of $8 million for very complex patent cases. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, supra note
95, at 1-129.
109. Nerkar & Macmillan, supra note 104, at 8-9; see Cotropia, Real Options, supra note
7, at 1138-39; Partnoy & Martin, supra note 7.
110. Nerkar & Macmillan, supra note 104, at 7-9; see Cotropia, Real Options, supra note
7, at 1138-39.
111. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7 at 1139; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006)
(setting the patent term).
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may expire de facto if the right to exclude loses its value completely
(for example, if non-infringing substitutes enter the market and
compete effectively with the patented technology or if the substitute
renders the patented technology obsolete). 112 The option itself will
also expire if the patent is declared invalid or unenforceable by a
federal court or by the USPTO in a reexamination proceeding. 113
When determining the duration of the patent option, a patent owner
must take into account not just the twenty-year term, but also the
uncertainty inherent in the scope of the right to exclude others (i.e.
how far will the right to exclude reach in its assertion?) and in the
potential for invalidation if asserted in a manner that subjects the
patent to challenge in court (i.e. will the patent be invalidated if it is
asserted against this infringer?). The timing of expiration will
influence whether the patent owner should exercise his option to
leverage, litigate, or license the patented technology.
B. The Potential for Underdevelopment of Patented Technology
Modeling patents as real options, scholars have linked early
filing by patent owners to a potential for underdevelopment of
patented technology. 114 In this view, because the rules for procuring
US patents encourage earlier filing for patent protection, patent
owners can buy the patent option inexpensively before any
considerable development occurs. As the patent owner faces a shorter
patent term, because the twenty-year patent term is tied to the
application filing and not the development of a viable product, he may
forego commercialization. 115
112. Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1139-40. Cotropia provides as an example
the patented audiocassette technology, which was rendered obsolete by MP3 players and
compact discs. Id. Exclusivity in the case of non-infringing substitutes or obsolete technology
does not give the patent owner the ability to demand a supracompetitive price for his patented
technology. Id. at 1140.
113. In contrast, Cotropia does not consider a declaration of invalidity or unenforceability
for inequitable conduct to constitute an expiration of the option; instead, he prefers to treat
invalid or unenforceable patents as unenforceable ab initio. Id. at 1141. However, patents are
presumed valid until declared otherwise in court. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. A patent that has not been
invalidated or declared unenforceable retains for its owner a valuable option to exclude others
from practicing the invention, provided the patent is not blatantly invalid (such patents are also
known as "scarecrow" patents). See Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.
1943) (invalidating an entire patent "because it has seemed to us proper that it should not
remain in the art as a scarecrow"). Understandably, scarecrow patents will carry no option value,
but surely this category of patents will be small if the USPTO examines patents with any level of
rigor.
114. See Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1073-74; Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 111.
115. Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1074; Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 81.
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The US patent procurement rules tend to encourage early filing
in at least four ways. First, the novelty and obviousness requirements
create a ticking clock; inventors have an incentive to file as early as
possible in order to establish priority over other inventors or public
disclosures that may render the subject matter anticipated or
obvious.11 6 Second, courts interpret the disclosure requirement to
allow for some experimentation by a skilled artisan carrying out the
invention, which permits an inventor to provide an adequate
disclosure without anticipating every detail of the invention's future
implementation.117 Third, the inventor does not need to show any
commercial viability to obtain a filing date, provided the invention is
operable and useful in theory. 118 Fourth, courts could reward early
filers in priority disputes between putative inventors because courts
recognize, as a constructive reduction to practice, the patent
application filing that meets the disclosure requirement.119 Working
together, these rules encourage an inventor to file an application for
an invention that is not yet reduced to practice120 but may be "ready
for patenting,"121 pushing patent applicants to file earlier. 122
116. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
117. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (discussing § 112 as requiring a
disclosure that teaches a skilled artisan "to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation," despite this qualifying language not appearing in the statute).
118. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529-30 (1966); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange
Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
119. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES &
MATERIALS 452-53 (5th ed. 2011). Merges and Duffy also note that the availability of provisional
applications under 35 U.S.C. § 111 has made constructive reduction to practice even easier and
less expensive to achieve. Id. Although the current priority rules are a unique feature of the US
first to invent patent system, recent passage of the America Invents Act (S. 23, H.R. 1249)
switches to a first inventor to file system, which may further encourage early filing by creating a
race to the patent office. See Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 81-82. For more information on the
first inventor to file system, see Press Release, US Senate, Understanding the America Invents
Act-Right of the First Inventor to File (2011), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/imo/medial
doc/PRESS-FirstlnventorToFile-OnePager-FINAL.pdf.
120. The reduction to practice of the invention marks the point in time when the inventor
recognizes that the invention works for its intended purpose. See Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan
Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383 (1928). The filing date of the application is considered a
constructive reduction to practice, but inventors may establish earlier reductions to practice in
order to win priority disputes or to antedate prior art cited against the application. See
Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment for patentee who
proved an earlier reduction to practice to antedate prior art reference).
121. See Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). Since the one year on sale bar of
§ 102(b) will be triggered by a commercial offer for an invention that is ready for patenting, it
follows that inventors who have inventions ready for patenting will be under some pressure to
file an application sooner rather than later if they have commercial prospects. Id. An invention's
readiness for patenting may be demonstrated in at least two ways: (1) with evidence of an actual
reduction to practice or (2) with evidence that the inventor has enough information to create the
disclosure required by § 112 paragraph 1. Id. at 67-68.
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
Some public benefits of early filing may include the facilitation
of commercialization and the earlier expiration of the patent identified
by patent scholars Edmund Kitch, John Duffy, and others. 123 As a
result, more patents are filed, examined, and issued. 124 Therefore,
encouragement of early filing may feature some underappreciated
costs, including inventors filing for too many patents because they are
eager "to compensate for the lack of invention information at the early
stage of development and to capture the new information encountered
at later stages." 125 Over-filing may result in further burdens on the
USPTO, a decrease in the quality of patent applications overall, the
promotion of "patent trolls," and the creation of uncertain patent
boundaries. 126 Of course, provided that the patent system works on
some level, extra applications are not concerning per se-technology
progresses, and worthless patents will not be enforced while valuable
patents will be commercialized and/or enforced.127 This account,
however, assumes that the patent owner has perfect information
about the patent's value, which is not possible given the inherent
uncertainty of patent scope and validity.
That earlier filing provides a strong incentive to commercialize
makes for a compelling story because the patent owner can facilitate
commercialization earlier and the technology enters the public domain
earlier.128 However, modeling the patent as a real option, where
future information helps the patent owner make sequential decisions
regarding whether and when to exercise its option to exclude others,
crystallizes concerns about extremely early patent filing.129 In fact,
earlier patent filing makes it less likely that the patent owner ever
122. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 72-82. Cotropia identifies a lack of barriers to early
filing, including: (1) no requirement that the invention be reduced to practice at the time of
filing, (2) a lax utility requirement, and (3) incentives to file early, including a constructive
invention date as of the filing date and a one-year bar to patentability measured from the filing
date. Id. Cotropia describes Kitch as "the most notable champion of early filing" in reference to
the prospect function. Id. at 82. Duffy also advocates for early filing as a way to push up the
patent term to reduce social costs of such patent races. See Duffy, supra note 21, at 466-67;
Kitch, supra note 43, at 270-71.
123. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 82-87 (identifying the facilitation of
commercialization, reduction of wasteful rivalry later in the development process, and early
expiration of the patent term); see Duffy, supra note 43, at 445; Kitch, supra note 21, at 266.
124. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 70.
125. Id. at 88.
126. Id.
127. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004); Cotropia, Folly,
supra note 7, at 107 ("If the early-filing doctrine leads to more of a good thing-that is, more
technological progress-then the extra applications are not a concern.").
128. See Duffy, supra note 21, at 445; Kitch, supra note 43, at 269-71.
129. See Cotropia, Real Options, supra note 7, at 1135-39; see generally Duffy, supra note
43; Kitch, supra note 21.
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commercializes the patented invention.130  Early ideas might be
technologically unsound or commercially worthless but the patent
owner may file anyway because of commercial potential.131
Subsequent to filing, the inventor identifies those patented
technologies that are worth pursuing and those that are not, leaving
many patented inventions on the cutting room floor.132 If patents
represent an option to decide later whether the patent owner should
exercise the option to leverage, litigate, or license the invention, then
the purchase price (the application fee and the cost of invention
needed to overcome the low barriers to patenting) limits the downside
risk of commercialization, which has infinite upside potential. 133 This
makes the deal of the patent too good to pass up; patenting requires
few resources prior to filing, but requires large amounts of resources
later to commercialize. 13 4 A small investment by the patent owner
makes him less interested in commercialization and "more likely to
ignore, and in turn devote less energy to pursuing, long-term
interests."135  Similarly, early patent owners may forego
commercialization precisely because of the shortened patent term.
Fearing appropriation by others after the patent expires, the patent
owner may perceive the shortened patent term as too short to
adequately commercialize prior to the expiration of his right to
exclude others. 136 If this is so, many owners may underdevelop
patents or not develop them at all; in other words, it will not be
worthwhile to the patent holder to exercise the option for full
commercialization. 137
III. ESCALATING COMMITMENTS TO TECHNOLOGY
When using real options logic to describe patents and their
commercialization, one assumes that the patent owner makes
informed strategic decisions to delay, abandon, or enforce his right to
exclude others. 138  In order for underdevelopment to occur as
theorized, the patent owner must be willing to file early and file often,
130. Cotropia, Folly, supra note 7, at 107.
131. Id. at 108.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 108-09.
134. Id. at 110.
135. Id. at 111.
136. Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1073.
137. Id. at 1073-74.
138. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1076-77 (discussing delay of
commercialization and abandonment); Nerkar & Macmillian, supra note 104, at 11 (discussing
information relevant to abandonment decision).
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perhaps at great expense, taking into account the potential for patent
races and early adversarial activity. He then must make crisp
abandonment decisions without taking into account his previously
sunk costs. Part III.A discusses the phenomenon of escalation of
commitment to losing courses of action, which influences patented
technology commercialization in ways that may actually encourage
development where real options logic predicts underdevelopment.
Although real options logic allows for a theoretical limit to downside
risk and for abandonment by the options holder at any time, many
technology firms may make decisions that are not in accordance with
such logic.139 Part III.B addresses the role that patents play in
escalation.
A. Sunk Costs and Escalating Commitment
Individual inventors like Chester Carlson and large
organizations like Xerox often face important dilemmas regarding
whether to continue to invest in technology projects that involve a
great deal of uncertainty. 14 0  Should the individual or organization
discontinue an unproductive line of research or commit more time,
effort, or resources into making the research and its subsequent
development pay off? 1 4 1 When project decision-makers face
uncertainty in determining whether to continue forward with a losing
course of action, in spite of its merits, it often leads to what has been
described as an escalation of commitment. 142  Researchers have
described salient examples of escalation behavior: Couples persist in
relationships that have deteriorated, a person at a bus stop waits
much longer than it would have taken to walk to his destination, or a
firm continues to invest in an unsuccessful technology. 143 In each of
139. See infra Part III.A.
140. See Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment to a Course of Action: A Reinterpretation,
11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 311, 311-12 (1986).
141. Id. at 311.
142. Glen Whyte, Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A
Prospect Theory Approach, 54 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROC. 430, 431 (1993).
Escalation of commitment has been described by several names, including "too invested to quit,"
the sunk cost effect or bias, and entrapment. Id. In each case, the decision-maker tends to
continue with the course of action once investments have been made, even if new information
indicates the course of action has the potential to be a losing one. Id. at 430-31.
143. Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward
Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39 (1992). Another particularly salient example of
escalation of commitment in the political sphere occurs in the context of wars and international
conflicts. See Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Commitment to a Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical
Perspective, 23 ADMIN. Sl. Q. 40, 40 (1978) (citing Memorandum from George Ball to Lyndon
Johnson (July 1, 1965), in PENTAGON PAPERS (Neil Sheehan ed., 1971)). In reference to the
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these situations, "[c]ommitment tends to beget commitment, and
investment to beget investment" 44 as decision-makers consider prior
sunk costs relevant to future decisions. 14 5
The escalation of commitments phenomenon can be attributed
to both objective characteristics of the project as well as behavioral
factors associated with the decision-maker.14 6  When accounting for
objective characteristics about the project at hand, typically a
decision-maker will withdraw from courses of action when the
prospect of future outcomes becomes certainly and sufficiently
bleak.14 7  Indeed, escalation might not occur at all if the decision-
maker has conspicuous and relevant information regarding the
probabilities of future outcomes available to him.14 8  But continuing a
project in the face of setbacks, especially financial setbacks, is not
always irrational. In order to make a decision to commit to or
withdraw from a course of action, a decision-maker should consider
whether negative feedback from the project is temporary or
permanent, what effect continued investment will have on the future
expected return on investment of the project, what further investment
will add to future costs, whether the proposed investment will be
Vietnam conflict, a memorandum from Undersecretary of State George Ball to Lyndon Johnson
warns of escalation effects: "Once we suffer large casualties . .. our involvement will be so great
that we cannot-without national humiliation-stop short of achieving our complete objectives."
Staw, supra.
144. Jeffrey Z. Rubin et al., Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps, 24 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 405, 406 (1980) (collecting citations).
145. Whyte, supra note 142, at 431. Whyte suggests that taking sunk costs into account
"violates a fundamental tenet of standard economic rationality and can lead to normatively
inappropriate choices." Id. According to one view, decision-makers exhibit irrationality because
they are engaging in "behavior not explained by either objective circumstances or standard
economic decision-making." Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Understanding Behavior in Escalation
Situations, 246 SCIENCE 216, 216 (1989) (citing ALLAN I. TEGER, TOO MUCH INVESTED TO QUIT
(1980); Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Joel Brockner, Factors Affecting Entrapment in Waiting Situations:
The Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Effect, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1054 (1975);
Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Cormitment to a Chosen
Course of Action, 16 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 27 (1976)). Another view
proposes that escalation of commitment is rational because of information effects, financial or
time constraints, or because the decision-maker takes into account the high costs of withdrawal,
including psychological and social harms to the individual or organization such as reputational
harms or embarrassment. Staw & Ross, supra (citing Gregory B. Northcraft & Gerrit Wolf,
Dollars, Sense, and Sunk Costs: A Life Cycle Model of Resource Allocation Decisions, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 225 (1984)). Staw and Ross suggest that this debate over rationality detracts from
the effect itself, preferring to focus on the behavioral and economic factors that contribute to an
escalation of commitment. Staw & Ross, supra.
146. Staw & Ross, supra note 145.
147. Id.; Itamar Simonson & Barry M. Staw, Deescalation Strategies: A Comparison of
Techniques for Reducing Commitment to Losing Courses of Action, 77 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 419,
420 (1992).
148. Staw & Ross, supra note 145.
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effective in turning the project around, and whether previous
commitments of investment have failed to bring the project around. 149
The decision-maker also should consider timing, specifically whether
delay is a normal part of the project. 50  In projects with long
timeframes between initial costs and future benefits, such as research
and development projects, early underperformances may not be
monitored closely or projects with high termination costs and little
salvage value may be allowed to continue without much investigation
into future probability of success.15 1  Unfortunately, real-world
decision-makers face much more ambiguous situations. 152  When
deciding whether to commit more resources, information regarding the
value and probability of future returns may be ambiguous or
completely lacking; the value and probability of future returns may
depend on many unknown (and perhaps unknowable) factors. 153 The
perceived value and probability of success affect a decision-maker's
resource allocation decisions. 54  Without clear and salient
information, an escalation tendency may result in a poor and costly
decision. The value of future returns may intensify if past losses like
sunk costs loom large, as discussed below.
In addition to these objective indicia, certain behavioral factors
appear to influence the relevance of sunk costs when deciding to
escalate commitments.155 In the realm of psychological and social
motivation, studies of commitment often emphasize self-justification
bias-the decision-maker may be biased toward choices that justify his
previous decisions.156 A decision-maker may continue to invest in
losing courses of action when he has a strong individual desire to
make the correct decision or to convince himself or others that his
decision is competent or rational.15 7 Often, the decision-maker tries to
make earlier failed decisions pay off by committing more resources to
149. Id.
150. Simonson & Staw, supra note 147.
151. Thomas S. Bateman, The Escalation of Commitment in Sequential Decision-Making:
Situational and Personal Moderators and Limiting Conditions, 17 DECISION SCI. 33 (1986); Staw
& Ross, supra note 145, at 216-17; Barry M. Staw & Fredrick V. Fox, Escalation: The
Determinants of Commitment to a Chosen Course of Action, 30 HUM. REL. 431, 447 (1977). This
effect may become "greater when opportunity costs for one's money . . . are presented explicitly to
individuals." Simonson & Staw, supra note 147.
152. Simonson & Staw, supra note 147.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Staw & Ross, supra note 145, at 217.
156. Id.; see Whyte, supra note 140, at 313.
157. Whyte, supra note 140, at 313; Staw & Ross, supra note 145, at 217.
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the project to effectuate a turnaround. 15 8 Additionally, the motivation
to justify one's decisions may affect the decision-maker's search for
and storage of information regarding the project's value.159
In addition to self-justifying, a decision-maker also may be
biased in other ways. For example, he may favor his preexisting
opinion, choosing to discredit conflicting information or to make use of
positive or exonerating information to the exclusion of negative or
blaming information.160 Additionally, the decision-maker may suffer
from a self-inferential bias, becoming especially bound to a course of
action when the decision to commit more resources is, inter alia,
unambiguous, highly public, visible, irrevocable or hard to undo. 161
Finally,' the decision-maker may be biased toward choices that
externally justify his previous decision, committing to a course of
action because he may be insecure in his job or would like to reverse
the course of a policy failure by committing more and more
resources. 6 2
Other psychological or social factors influencing commitment to
a course of action include a desire to avoid wasting resources, a norm
or preference for consistency, the nature of one's opponent, audience
effects, interpersonal competition, and political vulnerability. 6 3 Some
scholars even suggest that a memory kludge explains escalation; an
imprecise memory of a profit forecast may cause investors to utilize
sunk costs as a signal that the prior profit forecast indicated high
commitments of resources would be needed in the future. 164 In this
event, the decision-maker may be rationalizing his actions as well as
158. Staw & Ross, supra note 145. Further commitment of resources somehow justifies
the initial decision, or at least provides further opportunities for it to be proven correct.
Northcraft & Wolf, supra note 145, at 226.
159. Staw & Ross, supra note 145, at 217.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 577, 580 (1981). Staw suggests that "such external justification could well be stronger than
the protection of self-esteem" found in internal or self-justification. Id. (emphasis in original).
163. Id. A norm for consistency predicts that organizations value administrators who are
consistent in their actions over those that switch from one line of conduct to another. Id. at 581.
Administrators are highly rated "when they followed a consistent course of action and were
ultimately successful," leading to a "hero effect" for administrators who ultimately succeed after
several rounds of apparent failures followed by continued commitment of resources. Id. For
discussion of how the perception of sunk costs as potential waste encourages further investment,
see Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985).
164. Sandeep Baliga & Jeffrey C. Ely, Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a
Memory Kludge, AM. ECON. J.: MICROECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/baligalhtm/29%2OBaliga%2OMnemonomics.pdf (last
visited Feb. 15, 2011).
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justifying his previous behavior, making escalation of commitment
likely to occur.
Decisions to escalate often occur within firms where
psychological and social influences are hard to prove empirically.
Behavioral economics therefore may be helpful for describing
escalation of commitment situations without resort to psychological
and social motivation of individuals within a group. 165 Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, pioneering scholars in the field of
behavioral economics, propose one such explanation; they suggest a
prospect theory positing that a decision-maker may be heavily
influenced by how he frames the decision: in particular, how he
perceives the risky choice in terms of gains or losses.166
Generally, decision-makers, like most people, are risk averse,
"normally preferring a sure thing to a gamble of equal expected value,
and preferring a gamble of low variance over a riskier prospect."167
Observing research subjects making various choices between gambles
of varying probability, sure losses, and sure gains, Kahneman and
Tversky identified an abrupt switch to risk seeking when the subjects
faced risky decisions; the switch could not be explained by the utility
function of wealth.168 They developed an alternative theory of choice
under risk, which they called "prospect theory,"169 proposing that the
carriers of utility are gains and losses-changes in wealth, not states
of wealth-"relative to some reference point, generally the status
quo."170
When making risky decisions, prospect theory of choice
predicts that people become risk seeking in the following four ways. 171
165. Whyte, supra note 142, at 432-36 (describing the need for more broadly applicable
explanations for escalation at the group level of analysis).
166. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOL. 341, 343-44 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman and Tversky,
Prospect Theory]. Kahneman won the 2002 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel (often referred to as the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics) for his
collaboration with Tversky in developing the prospect theory. See Ludy T. Benjamin, Behavioral
Science and the Nobel Prize: A History, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 731, 739-40 (2003).
167. Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. ScL 17, 18 (1993).
168. Id.
169. The prospect theory of patents and the prospect theory of decision making under
risk are separate concepts. Kitch's prospect theory, or function, of the patent system refers to the
prospect of future value. Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory of decision making under risk
refers to the prospect of loss driving a switch to risk seeking from risk aversion.
170. Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference and the Law, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1115, 1117-18 (2003).
171. Id. at 1118.
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First, people choosing between gains remain risk averse, but people
choosing between losses become risk seekers. 172  Second, people
choosing between low probability gains become risk seekers, and
people choosing between low probability losses remain risk averse.173
Third, people are disproportionately loss averse-in other words,
"losses loom larger than [equivalent] gains." 74 Finally, people tend to
"overweigh[ outcomes that are considered certain, relative to
outcomes which are merely probable"-referred to as the certainty
effect.175 In sum, as described by Kahneman and Tversky, "a person
who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles
that would be unacceptable to him otherwise." 76
The prospect theory of choice readily applies to commitment
decisions. "[D]ecisions made subsequent to related decisions will be
framed in such a way as to reflect the success or failure of the previous
decision."177 In other words, a decision-maker will perceive a decision
based upon positive feedback as a choice between gains, and a decision
based upon negative feedback as one between losses. 178 Faced with
such a choice between losses, decision-makers engage in risk seeking
172. Id. at 1118. Guthrie gives as an example the fact that people will choose to receive
$1,000 over a 50 percent chance of receiving $2,000 (risk aversion), but will choose a 50 percent
chance of paying $2,000 over definitely paying $1,000 (risk seeking). Id.
173. Id.
174. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 166, at 279. As Kahneman and
Tversky note, "the aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be
greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same amount." Id. (citing Eugene Galanter
& Patricia Pliner, Cross-Modality Matching of Money Against Other Continua, in SENSATION AND
MEASUREMENT 65 (Howard R. Moskowitz et al., eds, 1974)). Notably, Adam Smith recognized
this phenomenon 200 years earlier, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: "Pain . . . is, in almost all
cases, a more pungent sensation than the opposite and correspondent pleasure. The one almost
always depresses us much more below the ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of
our happiness, than the other ever raises us above it." Nava Ashraf et al., Adam Smith,
Behavioral Economist, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132-33 (2005) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 176-77 (D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie eds., 1981) (1759)). Indeed, losses
generally appear twice as pungent or aggravating than equivalent gains. See Kahneman &
Lovallo, supra note 167, at 18 (describing a loss aversion coefficient from Kahneman and Tversky
as 2 and from 2 to 2.5 in other cited studies); see also Richard H. Thaler et al., The Endowment
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63, 70 (1992) (observing a ratio of 2 to 1 between
gains and losses).
175. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 166, at 265. For example, people
prefer a definite prize of a one-week tour of England over a 50 percent chance of winning a
three-week tour of England, France and Italy, yet prefer a 5 percent chance at winning the
three-week tour over a 10 percent chance at winning the one-week tour. Id. at 267.
176. Id. at 287. Kahneman and Tversky note that the observation that "bet[ting] on long
shots increases in the course of the betting day . . . support[s] [their] hypothesis that a failure to
adapt to losses or to attain an expected gain induces risk seeking." Id.
177. Whyte, supra note 140, at 312.
178. Id.
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instead of withdrawing from the losing endeavor, manifesting in
escalated commitments. 179
Costs sunk into a technology research and development project
may be framed as losses, turning decisions about whether to continue
the original course of action into a choice between losses.180 On the
one hand, abandonment of the project is a certain loss. On the other
hand, continuing with the highly uncertain course of action introduces
a less-than-certain probability that the project will incur further
losses. If the decision-maker accepts sunk costs as relevant but has
not yet made peace with them, 181 he likely will frame the choice as one
between losses, and will seek risk by continuing with the course of
action, for there lies a probability, however small, of success.
Therefore, one consequence of framing the decision as one between
losses is an escalation of commitment, which occurs regardless of
whether the decision-maker suffers from cognitive biases like self-
justification or other internal motivations. 18 2  This makes prospect
theory a compelling explanation for escalation of commitment
behavior, especially when it occurs in projects involving research and
development that are highly uncertain and involve a significant
amount of sunk costs, including time, effort, and resources. If the
research and development project features patented technology, the
patents themselves may play a role in keeping sunk costs salient.
B. Not-So-Obvious Role of Patents as Escalators
As discussed in Part I, the patent system is often justified as
providing incentives to create, disclose, and commercialize
inventions-the process of innovation-which contributes benefits to
society that hopefully outweigh the social harms of providing private
exclusive rights to inventors for limited times. 183  Because
commercialization remains a critical part of the innovation process,
the question remains why some firms commercialize inventions
despite a low probability of success and whether such commitments to
179. Id.
180. See id. at 316.
181. For example, if the costs still possess economic value in their original use or have
yet to be fully depreciated. See id.
182. See id. As Whyte notes, some of the research in this field does not support the idea
that motivational biases cause escalation. Id. at 314. Research subjects often pushed to complete
projects despite prior extensive sunk costs, even if the subjects "were not personally responsible
for the incurring of those costs." Id. Moreover, subjects demonstrate escalation of commitment
when participating in games of chance, even though previous failures may be credited to luck
rather than individual capabilities. Id.
183. See supra Part I.
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high-risk, high-reward courses of action are important to the patent
system as a whole.
An important preliminary question is where do patents fit into
a company's decision to invest in the commercialization of its
technology? A recent survey indicates that almost all companies
obtaining patent protection state that they do so in order to secure an
advantage over their competition. 184 Since start-up companies often
lack other measurable values of success, in addition to the traditional
rule of excluding others, patents also play an important role among
financial and reputational concerns for companies, especially in the
very early stages of raising capital to fund commercialization of
inventions.185 Patents may also be valuable in allowing the company
freedom to operate in a certain sphere, as a signal to others of
technological quality or as a hedge against the failure of the
company. 186
Based upon such survey data, 87 patents appear to be very
important when firms make investment decisions about technology
projects. Situated in the context of a long-term innovation project
involving sequential investment of time, effort, and capital, patents
appear to be a factor driving decisions to proceed with the project.s18
Indeed, the creation of innovations, obtaining patent protection, and
using the resulting patents to pursue business opportunities may
constitute a value chain such that the coordination of these various
chain links increases returns. 89
Companies do not purchase patents in a vacuum, however.
Research and development activities involve a number of start-up
costs, including, inter alia, creating a new department, purchasing
physical assets, hiring and training personnel, collecting information
184. Stuart J. H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1288-89 (2009).
Graham and his co-authors present data from the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, which collected
responses about patenting decisions from 1,332 companies less than ten years old (i.e., true
start-ups). Id. at 1260, 1272. Apart from limiting rivals (or exercising the right to exclude), firms
also noted that they used patents to prevent copying by rivals, to improve their chances of
securing investment from outsiders, to obtain licensing revenues from licensees, to improve the
chances or quality of liquidity of their company, to defend against patent infringement litigation
from others with patents, to improve negotiation positions for cross-licensing with others, and to
enhance or improve the actual product's or service's image. Id. at 1297-1309.
185. Id. at 1303.
186. Id. at 1306-07. See generally Long, supra note 25 (using patents as signals);
Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 30 (building patent portfolios for diversification).
187. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341 (2010).
188. See Marcus Reitzig & Phanish Puranam, Value Appropriation as an Organizational
Capability: The Case of IP Protection Through Patents, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 765, 768 (2009).
189. Id. at 768-69.
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on new technologies, and other organizational and informational
activities. 190 Innovative companies must make an initial decision to
"go/no-go" forward on research that may be at an early stage of
conception. 191 Early filing pressure of patent races and rules rush this
decision forward. 192 Because firms may be competing with rivals to
obtain patents on early conceptions, they incur costs in reliance on
future gains from obtaining patents and developing the underlying
technology. Winners of this patent race obtain a patent on the early-
stage technology. 193 Apart from any feelings of regret after winning
the race, the patenting firm must decide whether to proceed with
development of the invention.
In deciding to go ahead with inventing and to enter the patent
race, a potential patent owner may have based his decisions on the net
present value of future returns.194 As the patent race unfolds and the
patent owner devotes time, effort, and capital to the venture, he may
be less likely to have an objective view of the future gains from
winning the race and of the probability of success of any
commercialization of the patented technology. The patent owner may
therefore be poised to view the sunk costs of research and patent
racing as a certain loss that must be mitigated by the hopeful gain of
development of the invention. Although the remaining patent term
may be shorter than he would prefer, a decision to move forward with
development and the hope of gains, however remote, may be more
attractive to a patent owner than abandoning the operation and
leaving his hard-won patent undeveloped. By making the sunk costs
of early research more salient, patent races may encourage
commercialization rather than abandonment of the patented
technology if patent owners frame sunk costs as losses; this in turn
190. Juan A. MAiiez-Castillejo et al., The Role of Sunk Costs in the Decision to Invest in
R&D, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 712, 713 (2009).
191. See Pilar Carbonell-Foulquid et al., Criteria Employed For Go/No-Go Decisions
When Developing Successful Highly Innovative Products, 33 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 307
(2010) (discussing go/no-go decision criteria in the context of new product development).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 120-137. See generally Cotropia, Folly, supra
note 7.
193. And perhaps suffer from the "winner's curse." See Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's
Curse, in RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC
LIFE 50, 51 (1992). The "winner's curse" describes a phenomenon where the winner of an auction
will be a loser (or "cursed") in one of two ways; either (1) the winner pays more than the good
being auctioned is worth to him, or (2) the value of the good ends up being less than its
pre-auction estimated value, to the winner's dismay. Id.
194. See McGrath & Nerkar, supra note 75, at 4. According to McGrath and Nerkar,
conventional investment theory "suggests firms should proceed to invest in all projects with a
positive net present value" and "establish a discounted cash flow valuation for each project." Id.
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may drive them to commercialize inventions and invest more
commitments to such technology.
Moreover, the rhetoric of incentive and reward within the
patent system may encourage the sunk cost effect. Only a small
percentage of patents are enforced or commercialized, yet patent
filings continue to increase. 195 Start-up companies admit to valuing
patents for their leverage to limit rivals and to raise funds more so
than was previously thought.196 Patents hold out the promise of
future recoupment. 197 The incentive functions of the patent system,
both for invention and for commercialization, may prevent the patent
owner from coming to terms with pre-patenting costs and energy
invested into the technology.
Indeed, the prospect function of patents (again, not to be
confused with the prospect theory of decision making) may have more
of an effect in this regard. The race for a pioneering patent, or a
parent broad enough to allow coordination by the patent owner of the
search for improvements and commercialization, may involve "gold
rush" type races. In such cases, the winner may be better invested in
the technology because the prospect of the patent's worth will be
greater than in cases where the race is concerned with an
unpatentable innovation or worthless market position.9 8 In this
manner, the escalation of commitment may keep the pioneering
patent owner more interested in the technology, regardless of any
information he may have with respect to the value of commercializing
the patented technology. Despite the early patenting, the patent
owner may ignore the shorter patent term and continue with
investment anyway because he is too invested to quit. 199
Interestingly, patent race losers may also succumb to the
escalation of commitment phenomenon. Because the losers have
expended resources in research to win the patent race, once the
winner obtains a patent, the losers will have a slate of sunk costs and
fewer options for development because of the fear that they will not
have freedom to operate within the space of the winner's rights.
Instead of turning to another field altogether, these firms may use
knowledge gained in the race to proceed into related or similar fields
with high levels of uncertainty or risk. Additionally, they may
195. Compare Allison et al., supra note 127 (examining litigated patents to explain where
value lies in patents), with Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521
(2005) (quantifying patent worthlessness).
196. Graham et al., supra note 184, at 1326.
197. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 23, at 294.
198. See Duffy, supra note 21, at 458.
199. See Whyte, supra note 140, at 313.
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continue to make improvements on the original patented technology,
contracting with the original patent owner over permissions and filing
for blocking patents to enhance bargaining. From this vantage point,
the sunk costs that companies experience in a patent race, including
initial research costs, may propel the firms forward in decisions to
continue with development. This will occur despite any negative
feedback regarding the potential for gains within the patent term (for
the patent winners) and despite any negative feedback regarding
potentially limited freedom to operate (for the patent losers).
This insight may be lost if companies model research and
development projects and the underlying patents as real options. As
described above, 200 the logic of real options has become very useful for
companies that engage in high technology projects. 201 A discounted
cash flow model-a standard model of investing in projects-requires
that a company calculate the net present value of the project by
discounting future estimated cash flows in accordance with the level of
risk.202 This model tends to dissuade investment in information, the
basis of technology commercialization, because the value of
information as an asset is both "intangible and uncertain," making
risk difficult to assess.203 Moreover, a discounted cash flow model also
ignores the value that may be present as a result of flexibility as to
how the company may accomplish the project.204
Companies that use a real options model make incremental
decisions to invest akin to buying an option on the technology
(establishing a test market, exploratory ventures or pilot programs)
that "provide an opportunity for, but not the commitment to, pursuing
full investments (exercising options) later."205 By buying the real
option on the technology, the company, in theory, can allow the
uncertainty to resolve itself before further committing to the project. 206
As with financial options, the real option retains the upside potential
gains of the technology and minimizes the downside risk of loss. 2 07
The option value may be far above the calculated net present value
200. See supra Part III.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 80-88.
202. Edward H. Bowman & Gary T. Moskowitz, Real Options Analysis and Strategic
Decision Making, 12 ORG. SCI. 772 (2001).
203. Russell W. Coff & Kevin J. Laverty, Real Options on Knowledge Assets: Panacea or
Pandora's Box?, Bus. HORIZONS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 73.
204. Bowman & Moskowitz, supra note 202, at 722.
205. Coff & Laverty, supra note 203.
206. Id.
207. See Rita Gunther McGrath, Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and
Entrepreneurial Failure, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13, 14, 25 (1999).
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that a discounted cash flow model may predict. As a result-projects
that are forecasted to have a negative net present value, in other
words, projects with high ex ante uncertainty for which a discounted
cash flow model might recommend against investments-may have a
high option value.208 Purchasing the option allows the company to
investigate and perhaps even resolve uncertainty before fully
committing its resources to the project. 209 Critically, if and when the
firm exercises the option determines whether the real option model or
the discounted cash flow model better projects cost and revenues for
the project. Using the real option model requires very thoughtful
decisions on the part of the company with regard to exercise of the
option and the resulting commitments to full or sequential investment
in a technology's development. 210
Research and development to build knowledge assets, like the
information protected by patents, involves both a high level of
uncertainty and a specific amount of necessary technology transfer or
integration with preexisting knowledge. Obviously, more
uncertainty-as to future revenues and costs, as well as to technical or
commercial success-drives the value of the option higher.2 1 1 A lack of
integration or technology transfer upon purchase of the option, that is,
a great deal of isolation of the technology from the beginning, drives
the exercise price up because complementary assets and other
integration within the firm may be required before the project can
advance full steam ahead. 212
As a company approaches the decision regarding whether to
exercise the option, it must take into account the uncertainty
remaining as well as what the exercise price may be in terms of
investment costs. If the firm has already absorbed the project, the
firm may escalate its commitment to the project and exercise the
option despite some remaining uncertainty; in this way, the company
is seeking risk in moving forward with the project rather than
accepting the previously sunk costs of purchasing the option in the
first place (and any interim decisions to move forward, if this is a
208. Id.
209. McGrath & Nerkar, supra note 75, at 3. McGrath & Nerkar note that an investor
who has reduced uncertainty can elect to exercise only those options that are "in the money." Id;
see also Ziedonis, supra note 75, at 1630 (finding that firms "deciding whether to license a
university technology . . . are more likely to purchase options for inventions characterized by
greater technological and commercial uncertainty").
210. Coff & Laverty, supra note 203, at 74.
211. In this manner, real options are similar to financial options where volatility creates
a more valuable option. Kharabi, supra note 89, at 213.
212. Coff & Laverty, supra note 203, at 74.
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series of options on investing in the technology).213 If the project
remains isolated, the firm may be more likely to decline to exercise the
option, even if the technology has very promising prospects for
commercialization and the firm has resolved much of the uncertainty.
By describing patents as real options, as opposed to the
decisions to invest in technology projects as described above, scholars
have seized upon a very useful methodology for introducing flexibility
and uncertainty into the ability to value patents at the time of
issuance. One drawback to the method, however, is that patents are
but one piece of the innovation puzzle. Using a real options model for
patenting invites the same dilemmas facing innovative companies as
using a real options model generally for a smart strategy of investing
in high-technology. Specifically, exercising the option may be a losing
proposition that the firm is unable or unwilling to accept.
One major concern is that options on technology assume a
company has the ability to delay exercising the option as the company
manages uncertainty. 214 Previous models of patents as real options
similarly assume that the patent option comes with a choice to delay
commercialization of the underlying technology. This is true, but
delay in the world of technology can have major implications. Many
technological projects require maintenance. Indeed, patents require
maintenance fees that companies should account for in the exercise
price. 215 At minimum, maintenance fees and general technology
maintenance costs may represent minioptions within the series of
options represented by the patent-further decisions for the patent
holder to make regarding whether to exercise the option. More
problematically, however, maintenance of the patent and of the
underlying technology represents further sunk costs into the project
that may remain particularly salient to the patent holder.216 Long
after the sunk costs of the conception, reduction to practice, patent
filing, and prosecution process, the patent holder may continue to
213. Id. at 75.
214. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 7, at 1076.
215. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)-() (2011).
216. The United States adopted patent maintenance fees in 1982. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)
(2006). Presently, a patent owner must renew his patent four years, eight years, and twelve
years from issuance by paying an increasing fee. Id. If the maintenance fee is not paid within the
specified amount of time, the patent expires prior to its statutory twenty-year term. Id. Some
economists have used patent renewal information to determine patent values overall. See
Francesca Cornelli & Mark Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J.
ECON. 197 (1999); Ariel Pakes & Mark Schankerman, The Rate of Obsolescence of Patents,
Research Gestation Lags, and the Private Rate of Return to Research Resources, in R&D,
PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 73, 75 (Zvi Girilches, ed., 1984); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the
Optimality of the Patent Renewal System, 30 RAND J. ECoN. 181 (1999).
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contribute small investments to the patent to keep it alive217 and to
the project overall to ensure that the technology will be ready when
the final decision to commercialize will be made. 218 These losses may
loom even larger than the original investment in the option and
encourage patent holders to ignore continuing uncertainty in order to
proceed with commercialization.
Moreover, real options logic is premised on the fact "that future
investment opportunities are contingent on prior investment
commitments, . . . [which] accounts for the sequential nature of choice
processes" (unlike net present value models).219 Recall that the real
options model aspires to make the most of the flexibility created by a
sequential investment plan that allows the options holder to abandon
the project any time prior to the next investment decision.220 In order
to make this opportunity a reality, the options holder must insist on
creating and adhering to rigid criteria specifying how success and
failure must be defined within the project.221 In certain cases, an
innovative company may want to make sequential investments but
keep flexibility as to the possibility of discovering new research paths,
even if receiving negative feedback regarding the original course of
action. If the company structures its investments as real options, the
company must rigidly apply its defined criteria for abandonment in
order to curb downside risk, but this rigidity foregoes the fluidity of
research.222 To the extent that the patent system cares about the
social benefit of innovation in its own right, then perhaps the
flexibility of research and the encouragement of new paths of
discovery despite negative feedback regarding the original
development are more appropriate models for innovation systems.
Further, abandonment decisions by companies using real
options models for their technology investments may be susceptible to
the sunk cost effect and escalation of commitment. Although
companies are cautioned to develop rigid criteria for abandonment so
that the real options logic provides the best results and the optimal
limit of downside risk, they may suffer from looming sunk costs and
continue with escalation, ignoring abandonment signals and
proceeding with investment or option exercise. 223 This is a real
concern, particularly in the context of high-risk, high-reward
217. See supra note 216.
218. See supra notes text accompanying notes 184-193.
219. Adner & Levinthal, supra note 69, at 74.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 74-75.
222. Id. at 75.
223. See id. at 74-77.
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technology where the company cannot resolve uncertainty sufficiently
to make the exercise decision easy at any stage of commercialization.
Companies have invested enough to purchase the option and rely on
the ability to abandon or delay commercialization of the technology in
the event that exercising the option would be too costly or
unproductive. The firm will frame as certain losses the sunk costs of
initial research, the costs of patenting, and any initial investments in
development that might be required to determine whether the
company should move forward. Future development may seem like a
long shot, but it is precisely this situation that encourages
escalation. 224
To be sure, because the patent system provides an incentive to
expend resources-obtaining the patent and completing a certain
degree of experimentation such that the standards for patentability
are met-the patent itself may encourage such escalation when
innovators view the patent as an asset to raise funds and to keep
rivals at bay. Both of these functions serve to keep the costs of
patenting, including the costs of research prior to patenting, salient in
the inventor's mind. Incentivizing investment in innovation
necessarily implies that private gains will outweigh private losses,
which presumably include sunk costs. 2 2 5 Patents thus may prevent
inventors from making peace with their losses such that they may
approach their future decisions with risk aversion. As a result,
patents may encourage escalation of commitment to failing courses of
action, or, at the very least, promote courses of action that are
uncertain enough to caution against development (perhaps because
the patent term is now too short for recoupment or because
competitors' activities have brought the technical merits of the
technology into doubt).
Escalation may occur naturally in those cases where patent
owners lack the ability or desire to implement sufficiently rigid
criteria to trigger abandonment when these owners receive certain
negative information. This effect may be multiplied across innovative
projects due to portfolio effects. Most firms obtain and enforce
portfolios of patents rather than single patents.226 In such portfolios,
firms are able to increase diversity and depth of technology, which in
turn increases value to the firm in ways that are multiplicative rather
224. See supra text accompanying notes 177-182.
225. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 30, at 43 (noting that the portfolio
approach is "the dominant approach to patenting in the real world").
226. Id. at 34.
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than additive. 227  As decisions to invest in projects rather than
individual patents are made, patents may have less sway in framing
decisions as between certain losses and probabilistic losses. A
portfolio holder is apt to be a large firm with multiple decision-makers
and perhaps more capable of abandoning projects despite large sunk
costs and high levels of uncertainty regarding future success.
However, patent portfolios related to an important technology project
suggest one potential downside-the potential for ignoring failure
signals. If technology projects comprise many patents, we can assume
that the technology itself is multi-faceted, at least to the extent that
the commonly owned patents are independent and distinct inventions
as required by law. 2 2 8 Such diverse and deep patent portfolios may
suggest to the firm that it can offset failing technology segments with
successful ones. In these instances, the patent portfolio may represent
a rather expensive insurance policy for protecting the right to exclude
others from practicing the new technology in whatever incarnation.
The sunk costs from patent procurement and the lack of attention to
signals of failure may combine to encourage escalation of the project at
hand.229
In sum, because escalation of commitment is likely to occur in
those situations where sunk costs remain on the minds of companies
and their decision-makers, patent owners may be more amenable to
escalate commitment to technology projects after they obtain patents
on the technology. A consequence of such escalation may be
overdevelopment of patented technology that might not otherwise be
developed, either because technical or commercial success is too
uncertain or the probability of recouping the costs of research and
development are too low to continue in light of a definite patent term.
If the promise of supracompetitive returns230 causes patents to keep
losses looming larger, perhaps companies will abandon too few
projects. Moreover, because the overdeveloped products or services
may make it to the marketplace, the escalation effect may only mean
227. Id.
228. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121 (2006). The Patent Act defines an invention in § 101 and
restricts each patent application to one "independent and distinct" invention. Id.
229. See Coff & Laverty, supra note 203, at 75. Coff and Laverty point to Minnesota
Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M), which maintains a large portfolio of patents, as an example
of a firm too committed to various investments to abandon any poorly performing technologies.
Id.
230. As described by Mark Lemley, supracompetitive returns may "not necessarily (or
even often) [be] pure economic monopolies, but returns that systematically differ from the
marginal cost of production." Mark A. Lemley, What's Different about Intellectual Property?, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2005) (describing such returns as "not costless" because they "distort[]
the market away from the competitive norm").
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that more development occurs on such projects than would otherwise
occur if the company had not obtained patents.
If companies treat patents as real options with a right to
exercise by way of excluding others through leverage, litigation, and
licensing, then we might believe that patents further escalate
commitment to litigating patents even after the value of the patents is
revealed to be lower than the potential gain from enforcement. First,
the exercise of the litigation option will be easier to value than the
exercise of the development option because litigation costs, while high
in many cases, are at least predictable to a degree (and perhaps
almost zero in the case of contingency litigation, a burgeoning method
of paying for patent litigation).231 Second, litigation is much easier to
abandon, or to settle for less than the option value, than ongoing
research and development projects with many aims and multiple
goals. 2 3 2 The enforcement component of this model looks like a true
real option where success can be easily defined, goals may be easily
marked, and abandonment may be easily accomplished. 2 33
IV. PROMOTING INNOVATION THROUGH SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Returning to Chester Carlson, our diligent patent attorney and
inventor of modern office copiers, Xerox's history presents a
technology development story that tests the assumptions of the sunk
cost effect and escalation of commitment. 234 Carlson filed his first
patent application in 1937 and achieved his first technical success in
1938.235 The following two decades were spent attempting to develop
the technology into a commercial office copier using xerography, first
by Carlson himself, then by his successor-in-interest Batelle (who
231. See Partnoy & Martin, supra note 7.
232. Id.
233. In fact, Partnoy and Martin point to these attributes to explain why the litigation
option is more favorable than the development option. See id. They propose making the litigation
option pricier to exercise as a way of making it less attractive to patent holders as compared to
the development option. Id. A patent "troll" may be a patent owner who solely exercises his
option or series of options to litigate. Id.
234. Duffy, supra note 21, at 463-64 (describing inventions, like Carlson's, which do not
involve dissipation of rents through patent races, as "situations where competition [drives] the
inventor to gamble on highly risky and unpromising technologies," and rents are thus preserved).
235. OWEN, supra note 3, at 97-98; Oliver E. Allen, The Power of Patents, 41 AM.
HERITAGE, Sept.-Oct. 1990, available at http://www.americanheritage.com/content/power-
patents; From One Copy to Trillions, Xerography Turns 70, Bus. WIRE, (Oct. 21, 2008), http://
www.businesswire.com/news/home/20081021005141/en/Copy-Trillions-Xerography-Turns-70
(noting that the first words Carlson copied were "10-11-38 Astoria"-the date and place of his
first successful attempt at xerography).
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bought the patents in exchange for a large royalty on future income)
and Batelle's licensee, Haloid Corporation (now Xerox). 2 36
The interim between Xerox's original investment in Carlson's
technology in 1946 and its first successful product launch in 1961237
comprised much doubt on the part of Xerox management. 238 Xerox
spent $12.5 million in development of xerography before the first
commercial copier, the 914 model, rolled off the assembly line in
1960.239 Consultants dismissed it, saying research showed that the
machine had "no future in the office copying market."240 Throughout
the 1950s, Xerox employees worked incessantly to perfect xerography
technology and to develop a plain paper officer copier despite negative
feedback regarding the success of the project.241 The Xerox 914 copier
created its own market, and became a very successful technology,
making its inventor, Carlson, and many others at Xerox very wealthy
through stock options issued to fund the development when other
revenue was insufficient.2 4 2
As Xerox engineers perfected the xerography process, Xerox
applied for and obtained patents on the technology.243 Beginning with
four fairly broad patents issued to Carlson, Xerox was able to obtain
countless more on improvements to the original xerography
technology.2 4 4 Xerox licensed some of these patents to competitors like
IBM and Western Electric to fund development of xerography, taking
the risk that one of its competitors would become interested in
xerography to the extent that it would purchase a commanding share
of Xerox stock. 2 45 Without the original Carlson patents and the ability
to immediately stop rivals from entry, Xerox may have been hesitant
to invest in xerography development. With patents in hand, and a
236. OWEN, supra note 3, at 104-07 (recounting rejection by IBM, among others); id. at
117 (describing Carlson's deal with Battelle); id. at 127 (describing Battelle's deal with Haloid
Corp.).
237. Xerox introduced a handful of copiers in the 1950s using xerography technology, but
none were ultimately successful in offices. See OWEN, supra note 3, at 151-56. The Model A
copier became successful for creating masters for certain older lithography copiers in the United
States. Id. Revenue from the Model A and its successor models made the later 914 model
possible; without it, Haloid Xerox would have had to cut back or abandon the xerography
development project long before the 914 model became successful. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 235.
240. Stephanie N. Mehta, The Office Copier Turns 50!, CNN (Jan. 22, 2010), http://
money.cnn.com/2010/01/21/technology/xerox-copiers.fortunelindex.htm.
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sizable investment made to Battelle, Xerox expanded its patent
protection outward and into the future with improvement patents.
Not only were Xerox's managers susceptible to a great deal of
psychological motivation to continue investing despite a low
probability of success in the marketplace and the introduction of
competing processes from rivals, but as sunk costs built up due to
royalties to Carlson and Battelle and to the costs of development,
Xerox's commitment began to beget more commitment.
Luckily for Xerox stockholders and employees, the gamble paid
off. The gains received from the development of the 914 model, sold
for many years, more than made up for the sunk costs into the project
and introduced Xerox to the Fortune 500.246 Xerox's ability to obtain
broad pioneer patents and later improvement patents enabled the
company to not only view such patents as positive assets should the
venture fail, but also to propel them forward to continue investing. In
this way, the specter of recoupment of past losses enabled a
commitment to the technology that might not have been present if
Xerox did not obtain patent protection.
Xerox appears to have become a success story through
persistence, 247 but the venture could have easily failed.248 Often,
development of patented technology despite clear negative feedback as
to the probability of success may result in commercial failure. 249
Edwin Land developed an instant movie camera in the late 1970s that
had no chance of commercial success and that lost Polaroid millions. 250
Mark Twain went bankrupt investing in the development of a
patented typesetter that could not be turned into a viable commercial
246. MARIUs LEIBOLD ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
218 (2002). Xerox became a Fortune 500 company in 1961. Id.
247. R. RAY GEHANI, MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND OPERATIONS 140-41 (1998)
(describing Haloid's transformation into Xerox as an example of a firm that achieved high
returns through maximum risk in developing a new product coupled with persistence by senior
management; see also CHARLES D. ELLIS, JOE WILSON AND THE CREATION OF XEROX 216 (2006)
(highlighting the persistence of Joe Wilson, President, CEO and Chairman of Haloid and then
Xerox from 1946 until his death in 1971, and its effect on Haloid's growth into giant Xerox
during his tenure).
248. "Time and again, potentially promising developments in xerography proved
disappointing." ELLIS, supra note 247, at 118.
249. See infra note 250.
250. VICTOR K. McELHENY, INSISTING ON THE IMPOSSIBLE: THE LIFE OF EDWIN LAND
409-24 (1998) (describing Land's insistence on commercial development of instant movie
technology despite technological limitations and the advent of VHS and Betamax as superior
products in the marketplace).
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model.251 Likewise, Thomas Edison almost went bankrupt developing
an iron ore concentration process that was ahead of its time, yet
commercially not viable. 252 Other failed innovations include IBM's PC
Jr. and Josephson Junction computers in the early 1980s, AT&T's
optical computer in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Apple's Lisa
personal computer in the early 1980s. 213 Importantly, had any of
these patent owners, including Xerox, objectively determined whether
they could make a working model commercially and whether the
pioneering or improvement patent terms provided sufficient time to
recover their development costs, the companies may have abandoned
the option to commercialize altogether.
There may be several explanations for continued
commercialization by companies who have sunk large costs into initial
patenting and early development. First-mover advantages and
network effects may prove that the technology is effective even
without patent protection. However, continued commercialization
may also include the possibility that companies like Xerox are driven
forward by patents because they keep the patent owner focused on the
prospect of future gains to recoup past losses. One primary concern
regarding firms' tendencies to escalate commitment to technology may
be an overdevelopment of patented technology. Under this theory,
patents are playing a role by incentivizing expenditures of resources
on technology fraught with uncertainty. A preference for gambling in
the face of certain losses comprises one driver of escalation of
commitments to technology development. Certain losses are
particularly distasteful to inventors and firms. As a result, a firm may
choose to seek risk when deciding whether to continue with the course
of action. Patents represent hope for recoupment in ways that keep
losses salient and keep decision-makers framing the decision to
commit more resources to development as a choice between losses
rather than a choice between gains. As this Article suggests, a desire
to avoid failure may drive escalation of commitments to uncertain
projects bolstered by patent protection.
251. See Paul Collins, Mark Twain's Big Mistake, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec. 3, 2005, at 54,
54-55 (describing Twain's captivation by riches and eventual bankruptcy at the hands of a
patented typesetter that failed to become a commercial success).
252. RANDALL STROSS, THE WIZARD OF MENLO PARK: How THOMAS ALVA EDISON
INVENTED THE MODERN WORLD 190-93 (2007). Stross notes that "Edison remained pitiably
hopeful about his Ogden [New Jersey] mine, even when objective facts made the future of its
business appear bleak to anyone else." Id. at 193.
253. See OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL 2.0: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF
THE WORLD'S MOST COLORFUL COMPANY 73-84 (2004); Duffy, supra note 21, at 464 n.99
(highlighting these failed innovations); Nico Krohn, Not as Easy as 1-2-3, INFOWORLD, Apr. 1.
1991, at 40, 41 (highlighting early personal computer failures, including IBM's PC Jr.).
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The Xerox story demonstrates that society may reap great
benefits from high-risk, high-reward successes achieved by those
companies who escalate commitment and succeed despite negative
feedback: companies like Xerox, who gamble on uncertain technologies
and win big.25 4 Perhaps our patent system is better off encouraging
pursuits of high-risk, high-reward inventions, and escalation of
commitment may be a catalyst to such encouragement. On the other
hand, a delay in development-abandonment of the technology
outright-might have been better for social welfare, given the
possibility of private waste and the administrative burden of granting
patent rights. Moreover, what is the cost of uncertain technologies
that do fail, apart from the private cost of failure? First, many
failures are not total losses. For example, Edison's novel process for
concentrating iron ore failed, but the technology Edison generated and
protected in patents ultimately became successful after World War
11.255 Whether due to a matter of capital or timing, one firm's failure
may become another firm's success in the future.
Apart from delay or better investment strategies simply
improving upon failures, technical and commercial setbacks may
expand the boundaries of innovation. When companies attempt to
invent technology, they develop knowledge assets, including patents,
which often they can use elsewhere to develop future products or
processes. Such failures breed success, and the commitments already
made to gain this knowledge, as well as the right to exclude, may
provide the basis for future technology gains. Patents here feed back
to the innovation, encouraging further innovation by incentivizing
both the patenting firm and new entrants.
Perhaps even more importantly, how can we encourage
companies to learn from their failures so to create the correct level of
investment without over- or underdeveloping patented technology?
Although real options logic provides a useful model for sequential
investments and decisions such as commercialization or litigation of
patents, firms hoping to take advantage of such models must
recognize the limitations. Namely, the right to abandon must be
taken seriously; otherwise escalation may become a rooted problem.
Some technology development problems may not lend themselves to
254. See F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3, 3 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
255. Michael Peterson, Thomas Edison: Failure, AM. HERITAGE INVENTION & TECH.,
Winter 1991, at 8.
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real options logic at all, particularly if the company has the ability to
affect the outcome of the investments being made.2 56
When patenting technology and employing resources, firms
must recognize the tendency to escalate commitments and temper that
escalation phenomenon with real options featuring rigid abandonment
criteria, perhaps from an outside objective source like advisory boards.
If real options theory is to be used successfully, firms must recognize
that the ability to abandon the project must be a realistic option. The
escalation of commitment cannot allow the firm to move past
exercising time frames and thereby continue to commit to investments
in technology likely to be unproductive.
V. CONCLUSION
The US patent system creates an incentive to invent and
commercialize, thereby encouraging early patent races of considerable
expense as well as premature patent filing. Real options logic models
describe research and development projects as well as patent
protection of underlying technology. Such an option includes the
right, but not the obligation, to litigate, license, or leverage the patent.
If patent owners make reliable decisions regarding abandonment or
delay, a risk of underdeveloped patented technology may arise
generally. However, because companies may prefer risk-seeking
behavior when facing ambiguous or negative feedback regarding
patent term or commercial viability, companies may commit to a
failing course of action, "throwing good money after bad." Modeling
patents and research and development projects as a series of real
options does not capture the escalating phenomenon. Such escalation
may result in extraordinary success-the large reward built into high-
risk, high-reward technology. Failures of technology, on the other
hand, may have mixed reviews in societal welfare terms. The
potential for waste may be offset by the valuable contribution to the
art. By embracing and learning from both successes and failures,
patent owners may achieve a better balance when making high-risk,
high-reward decisions.
256. See Ron Adner & Daniel A. Levinthal, Reply: Real Options and Real Tradeoffs, 29
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 120, 122 (2004) (arguing that real options logic may not be appropriate "when
firms can act to affect and create new outcomes-the setting of greatest interest to strategists- .
. . [because firms may] overestimat[e] the potential for gains and underestimat[e] the potential
for losses").
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